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1 Introduction
Recent cross-country panel regression analyses have
revived the debate over the effectiveness of
development aid on economic growth (World Bank
1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly et al. 2004;
Roodman 2007). These arguments have been fuelled
by results-based management of development aid,
such as the Paris Declaration, and naturally lead to a
call for more rigorous impact evaluation at the project
level. The importance of impact evaluation is
frequently stressed by the international aid community
(World Bank 2006 and Savedoff et al. 2006; Asian
Development Bank 2006; Banerjee 2007). 
Bilateral development aid institutions, however, have
been slow to respond to requests for impact
evaluation despite being in general agreement with
the targets of the Millennium Development Goals
and their stated commitment to pay due attention to
aid effectiveness. Why are bilateral development aid
institutions slow to accept the importance of impact
evaluations? In order to answer this question, this
article examines the experience of the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation’s (JBIC) rigorous
impact evaluation of Japan’s ODA projects and
draws some lessons relevant to other donor
institutions. We show that the particular features of
Japan’s aid, and the aid environment in general, are
impediments to adopting rigorous impact evaluations
on a full scale. We also examine what the
introduction of rigorous impact evaluation would
mean for bilateral aid.
While the proponents of rigorous impact evaluations
are drawing growing attention in the evaluation
community, one rarely sees a discussion of how one
can learn from past aid programmes in a systematic
manner. We point out that rigorous impact evaluation
alone cannot draw lessons from past aid programmes,
and argue that we must understand the mechanism
that produced the measured impact to better predict
future aid impacts. Summative aspects of rigorous
impact evaluations have been discussed intensively
while formative aspects have long been neglected.
Based on the Bayesian statistics/econometrics
literature, we will discuss one method of inferring
such mechanisms with data. We show the need for
sharing data and evaluation experiences among
evaluators, and the need for the evaluation community
to work more closely with the research community. 
After the introduction to this article, Section 2
examines the characteristics of Japan’s ODA and
describes how the aid community in Japan reacts to
requests for rigorous impact evaluation. Section 3
introduces evaluation designs, evaluation results, and
other findings of rigorous impact evaluation recently
undertaken by JBIC in Bangladesh and Peru. In
Section 4, we use the Bayesian framework to show
how rigorous impact evaluations can feed back into
the aid projects, and make the case for closer
collaboration between the international aid community
and the research community. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Japan’s development aid and rigorous impact
evaluation 
2.1 Japan’s ODA characteristics and their
implications on impact evaluations
The evaluation of Japan’s ODA takes place at three
levels – the policy, programme, and project levels –
and is conducted by three institutions – the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, JBIC, and JICA (Japan
International Cooperation Agency). According to the
ODA Evaluation Guidelines (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2003), the objectives of evaluation are
‘Feedback to ODA management’ and
‘Accountability.’ The impact of development aid is
perceived to be one of the criteria for evaluation as
mentioned in the ‘JBIC Ex-post Evaluation Report
on ODA Loan Projects 2006’. Methodologically,
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however, the standard evaluation assesses overall
project performance by process evaluation only and
rigorous impact evaluations are rarely performed or
officially incorporated in the Plan-Do-Check-Action
(PDCA) cycle of Japan’s ODA operations. 
The DAC peer review reports (2003, 2007) identify
five characteristics of Japan’s ODA that affect
evaluation. First, Japan’s ODA clearly focuses on
Asian countries for historical and geopolitical reasons.
This is shown by a quote from Japan’s Official
Development Assistance Charter, ‘Priority Regions:
Asia, a region with close relationship to Japan and
which can have a major impact on Japan’s stability
and prosperity and is a priority region for Japan.’ A
sizeable portion of Japan’s ODA is allocated to
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and India.
These countries are very populous, ranging from one
hundred million to more than one billion, and are
growing at faster rates than other economies.
Secondly, Japan’s ODA supports provision of large-
scale economic and social infrastructure, such as
roads/bridges, power stations, transmission lines,
water supply and so on. High population density,
high economic growth, and accompanying rapid
urbanisation in Asian countries have created
substantial demand for these projects. As noted in
Howard White’s article (in Banerjee 2007),
randomisation is impossible for this type of aid.
Thirdly, large-scale ODA projects tend to be financed
by loans while the small-scale projects are financed
by grants. Creating the counterfactual is difficult for
Japan’s development assistance because of its great
emphasis on large-scale infrastructural projects. The
impact evaluation of the Jamuna Bridge in
Bangladesh described in the next section illustrates
these challenges.
Fourthly, in Japan’s ODA, each of the three key
players conducts separate and independent evaluations
for each aid modality: grants, loans, and technical
cooperation. There is no practice of conducting joint
evaluation of all modalities of ODA (grant, loan, and
technical cooperation) within a certain sector or
country, and rigorous impact evaluation on a group of
small projects is rarely conducted.
Fifth, the Japanese government maintains a clear
principle of request-based commitments of aid. Unless
asked by the partner government, they will not
provide ODA. This approach has the advantages of
accommodating partner government preferences and
strengthening the project or programme ownership,
and limiting the aid agency to negotiations only with
the partner’s central government. However, this also
has an adverse implication for impact evaluations, as
most of the projects are chosen by the policymakers
leading to the likelihood of placement bias in a naïve
impact estimation. We turn to this problem in the
next section.
2.2 Implications of global trends
Since the late 90s, there has been a steady shift in
the types of projects Japan funds. The increased
support for small-scale rural infrastructure, such as
rural road and community waterworks projects, and
small-scale participatory projects, such as
microfinance and social funds, reflects the
increasingly decentralised decision-making on
development in the East and South Asian countries.
In many cases, these small-scale projects are
dispersed across rural areas, and are selected and
implemented by the local governments in those
areas, based on applications from local communities.
This creates a self-selection process in the project
implementation, which must be accounted for in the
rigorous impact evaluation studies. Microfinance,
which is rapidly expanding throughout Asia, is also
subject to selection bias. Econometric techniques for
controlling such bias have been developed but only
recently applied to aid-supported interventions.
These changes call for technical expertise in
controlling biases, and naïve impact evaluations that
ignore them are considered inaccurate. 
So far, it is fair to say that rigorous impact evaluation
has not played a vital role in Japan’s ODA. However,
JBIC is beginning to institutionalise rigorous impact
evaluations and plans to conduct a greater number
of impact evaluation studies. The impact evaluations
on FONCODES, a Peruvian social investment fund,
and another on the Jamuna Bridge, described in the
next section, reflect JBIC’s response to the growing
global demand for rigorous impact evaluation.
2.3 Steps for rigorous and frequent impact
evaluations
JBIC requires its evaluators to conduct a beneficiary
survey in all ex post evaluations of ODA loan projects.
In the beneficiary survey, however, the construction of
a counterfactual is not required. In addition, there are
few baseline surveys to collect information on the
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treated group at the household level, and even fewer
baseline surveys cover control groups. The resulting
evaluations are likely to be plagued with various kinds
of biases, so one must impose implausibly strong
assumptions and assume away the biases. This is clearly
unsatisfactory. If the intervention is randomised,
difference-in-differences (double differencing) allows
estimation of impact under plausible assumptions.
Randomisation, where possible, is the key step for
introduction of rigorous impact evaluations to get the
less bias-ridden impact estimates.
Among the difficulties attached to incoporating
baseline data collection, we note, is the vertical
segmentation of project flows in Japan’s ODA. In
Japan’s ODA projects, feasibility studies are
conducted by the technical cooperation agency,
JICA, not by JBIC which finances ODA projects. This
bureaucratic separation of technical assistance from
financial assistance is a significant barrier to the
introduction of rigorous impact evaluation in Japan.1
3 JBIC’s experiences in impact evaluation
3.1 The impact evaluations in Bangladesh and Peru
JBIC has conducted several impact evaluations on
ODA-funded projects. These evaluations employed
quasi-experimental designs. This section introduces the
impact evaluation on the Jamuna Bridge as a large-
scale infrastructure example and on FONCODES as a
dispersed area, small-scale infrastructure example.
3.1.1 Bangladesh: the impact evaluation on the
Jamuna Bridge2
Jamuna Bridge is one of the largest infrastructure
projects in South Asia, costing approximately
US$960 million. JBIC, ADB (Asian Development
Bank), and the World Bank jointly financed this
project, which constructed the 4.8km bridge and
30km of approach roads. The Jamuna River obstructs
smooth traffic between central Bangladesh and the
northwestern part of the country. Before the
completion of the Jamuna Bridge, the major mode
of transportation was ferry boats which took at least
two hours to cross the river. Due to the limited
capacity of the boats, there was a prolonged waiting
time for river crossing, in particular for freight trucks.
The Jamuna Bridge presumably has had a substantial
effect on commercial and economic movements
within the country, in particular in the movement of
agricultural products from the northwest to the
central region and movement of industrial goods
from the central to the northwest region.
The impact evaluation on the Jamuna Bridge uses
household income, agricultural production, and
agricultural inputs (such as pesticides and fertilisers)
as impact indicators. As baseline data at pre-
intervention were available, the evaluation uses the
difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. It is a
reasonable assumption that the treatment groups
had no opportunities to participate in the decision
regarding the placement of the Jamuna Bridge. For
this reason, the evaluation does not have to consider
selection bias. 
Five communities on the northwestern side of the
Jamuna River are defined as the treatment group
while two communities on the eastern side of the
river are the control group. From the universe of
survey data from the Bangladesh Institute of
Development Studies and that of another study by
the International Rice Research Institute, the
treatment and control groups were selected
randomly from the village-level population lists. In the
1997/98 season, before the bridge began to operate,
a census of village households collected data on 1,585
households. In 2003/04, the same households were
visited with the same questionnaires. The number of
households surveyed, however, decreased to 1,146 in
2003/04 due to migration and river erosion. The
number of households decreased further when some
of the households had to be omitted due to low
quality of the respondents’ answers. 
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Figure 1 Sampling map (impact evaluation of the
Jamuna Bridge)
DID is now considered one of the most reliable
estimators to measure policy impacts in the absence
of explicit randomisation. Our experience, however,
shows the difficulty in impact evaluation even when
researchers are equipped with the baseline data. The
high attrition rate, 28 per cent over six years or an
average of 5.4 per cent per annum, poses a potential
problem in the panel data analysis. If the migration is
related to the unobservables that may affect the
outcome of interest, then we have a sample
selection problem: the households that fall out of
the data set are those that earn less income and are
less well-off, leaving the higher-ability households in.
Hence the impact estimate is upwardly biased.3
Given we have only cross-section data for the
attributed households, one cannot test if the
attrition is due only to observables. However, the
limited size of the study budget did not allow the
evaluator to track down the migrated households to
determine the reasons for migration. Thus we had to
assume that the sample selection problem is
nonexistent, in other words, they are ‘missing at
random (MAR)’ after conditioning on the
observables.
The impact evaluation of the Jamuna Bridge brings
to light several findings and policy implications. The
treatment groups grew more high-value crops. The
Jamuna Bridge presumably decreased distribution
costs for these high-value but more perishable crops
and stimulated farmers to grow them. Storage
facilities for these crops would help farmers to earn
a better return. Furthermore, one of the unexpected
findings is a change in the credit sources. The
treatment groups relied more on NGO and less on
traditional credit sources (i.e. moneylenders and
friends/relatives). Although a similar pattern was
observed in the control groups, the change was
more significant among the treatment groups.
Cheaper costs for logistics improved not only access
to product markets but also to credit markets.
3.1.2 Peru: impact evaluation of the social investment
fund4
FONCODES, a Peruvian social investment fund,
supports small-scale infrastructure projects in rural
areas. JBIC provided ODA loans to FONCODES in
order to finance a wide variety of sub-projects in
eight provinces. The amount of investment of a
typical FONCODES sub-project ranged mostly from
US$30,000 to US$50,000 and the ODA loans that
JBIC provided enabled FONCODES to support more
than 1,000 communities. The application process of
FONCODES sub-projects is community-driven.
Community members organise a community
meeting, select a type of sub-project, and jointly
submit an application form to FONCODES.
FONCODES reviews these application forms and
selects sub-projects to be financed in consideration
of various factors such as poverty level, size of
investment, and FONCODES’ past support to the
community.
Three types of sub-project (rural road/bridge, water
supply, and rural electrification) were chosen for the
FONCODES impact evaluation from several lines of
support. As these are sub-projects, we can draw
upon a sufficient number of communities. Impact
indicators were set in consideration of their
relevance to the Millennium Development Goals. The
participatory nature of the selection process for the
sub-projects requires removal of selection bias in the
construction of a counterfactual. Baseline data were
available in only a few places at the community level.
This led the evaluators to use propensity score
matching at both community and household levels as
the way to control the self-selection bias. The
variables used in propensity score matching are
geographical variables, community characteristics,
and poverty assessment by the government.5
A household survey targeted information collection
from 2,240 households in 224 communities (10
households per community) in seven departments,
including both the treatment and control groups. A
sub-project selection model of the communities was
estimated for each sub-project with probit, using the
pre-intervention variables of pre-Census 1999 data
and the Poverty Map of 1996 as regressors. For each
line in each department, non-intervened
communities were identified as the potential
controls for all the intervened communities. A
community with the closest value to the fixed
propensity score radius was chosen as the control
community. This exercise was carried out for all the
communities and for the three types of sub-project
in each department.
From the impact evaluation on FONCODES, the
evaluation findings on water supply sub-projects
suggest that household characteristics play a crucial
role in the impact on health conditions. At the
community level, the main positive results found are
reduced daily time required to collect water, more
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expenditure on hygiene products like soap, and
improved perception of water quality. No significant
impact was found for indicators on health conditions
like incidence of diarrhoea in children 0–6 years old,
or nutrition status among children. At the household
level, however, two health indicators – incidence of
diarrhoea and that of skin diseases among children
0–6 years old – show positive results. The difficulty in
detecting the impact on health conditions by
community-level matching implies that household
characteristics play a crucial role in family health and,
therefore, knowing what happens inside the
household is an essential step in implementing water
supply projects as well as in impact evaluation.
3.2 Factors creating bias in the estimation of
impacts
3.2.1 Large-scale infrastructure projects
It is a conventional assumption that the closer the
treatment and control groups reside to each other,
the more similar their group characteristics will be,
including the unobservable community
characteristics. So whenever feasible, the evaluators
try to find control groups in proximity to the treated
group. The effects of large-scale infrastructure,
however, spill over from these areas. This makes it
inappropriate to select both the treatment and
control groups from proximate areas, and forces the
evaluators to find a more remote control group. We
therefore will be caught between a rock and a hard
place of the similarity concern versus the spillover
concern. The evaluators may not be able to find the
counterfactuals in the data, regardless of the
geographical coverage of the survey. In the impact
evaluation of the Jamuna Bridge, we assumed the
effect of the project on the control group on the
eastern side of the river to be negligible. But this
disregards the fact that the Jamuna River affects the
distribution of goods throughout the entire country.
Technically, large-scale projects have an equilibrium
effect that poses a challenge to rigorous impact
estimation. Large projects affect prices, so the
counterfactuals cannot be observed directly from the
data because people’s choices change along with the
price changes. Hence the counterfactual must be
computed using prices in the absence of the project.
For example, in the Jamuna Bridge case, the
construction of the bridge may have tightened the
ties between the rural and urban labour markets.
This increased the demand for labour in the rural
areas, and raised the income of labourer households.
So even in the control villages that seemed not to
have been directly affected by the bridge, income
increased. This may give a downward bias to the
simple impact estimate, as we cannot observe in the
data the rural income in the absence of greater
integration of the rural labour market with its urban
counterpart. The construction of the counterfactual
under the general equilibrium effects is not easy, and
requires simulation exercises. This means that the
evaluator not only needs to work with the
researchers, but also needs to impose more
assumptions on the economic relationships to keep
the computation feasible.
3.2.2 Dispersed small-scale infrastructure projects
On the other hand, the impact evaluation of
dispersed, small-scale infrastructure projects faces
different types of challenges for accurate estimation of
impact. Dispersed small-scale infrastructure projects
usually employ a community-driven application from
potential beneficiaries. This results in self-selection and
heterogeneity of interventions, both of which hinder
the accurate estimation of impacts. The first issue, the
self-selection bias, can partly be dealt with using the
propensity score matching method. However,
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Figure 2 Sampling map (the impact evaluation of
the social investment fund)
mimicking the application process in the estimation of
the propensity score is often more difficult than it
looks because the informal placement rules and the
internal dynamics within the community during the
application process are usually unobservable. One can
sometimes use local expertise to better deal with this
issue. For example, proximity to FONCODES field
offices was included in the estimation of
FONCODES sub-project selection probabilities after
the evaluators learned that the FONCODES
promotion activities rarely reach faraway
communities. A second issue, heterogeneity of
intervention, is the direct result of decentralised
decision-making because the design of sub-projects
will reflect local demands. Each type of sub-project
consisted of several sub-categories with minor
differences. The rural road/bridge sub-projects
include sidewalks within a community, unpaved roads
or bridges that reach other communities, and even
small bridges at the piers of small river ports. Some
roads are only for pedestrians and some are for
motor vehicles. It is possible to cope with
heterogeneity of intervention by further division of
sub-projects, but only at the cost of having a smaller
sample size.
3.2.3 Request-based commitments
Because the Japanese government provides ODA
on a request basis, impact estimation is also
constrained by the placement bias. It is reasonable
to think that the policymaker places the project
where it best suits his objective. If the placement is
correlated with unobservable factors such as the
ability of people to earn income that may influence
the outcome of interest, the availability of services
provided by the project will be correlated with the
unobservable, which we shall call, a. Such a
presumption is plausible when the policymaker has
the information that is relevant to placement but
not available to the evaluators. The policymaker may
want to choose areas reflecting higher a values, so
the impact on income will be greater. The
treatment thus may not be uniform across the
population, but is given more to the people with
higher as. We thus have an endogeneity problem
which results in an upwardly biased impact estimate
because the treatment is given primarily to the
people with above average ability. In the
FONCODES case, unfortunately, we could not
obtain information on a that might have influenced
the policymaker’s decision. We had no other choice
but to assume away the placement bias.
3.3 The current use of evaluation findings at JBIC
Rigorous impact evaluation is a powerful tool to satisfy
the objectives of summative evaluation by providing
useful information to policymakers, who then decide
whether to continue the intervention or to change
the design of future interventions. JBIC currently uses
the evaluation findings such as those mentioned above
mainly to satisfy calls for accountability. This is another
effective use of summative evaluation, as the
evaluation findings show the results in a clear-cut
manner. JBIC conducts ex post evaluations on all
projects by using the framework of the DAC Five
criteria, some of which (‘Effectiveness’ and ‘Impact’)
touch upon the aid effectiveness of projects.
Nevertheless, the analysis at ex post evaluation rarely
goes beyond ‘Before/After’ or ‘Planned/Actual’
comparison of key performance indicators. Although
‘Before/After’ or ‘Planned/Actual’ comparison can
show rough results of projects, these suffer from
various biases explained above. In understanding aid
effectiveness, the rigorous impact evaluation gives a
clearer picture of Japan’s ODA projects, and should
serve the accountability purpose better.
Despite our support for the promotion of internally
valid impact evaluation and the development of
externally valid knowledge, we do not support
discontinuing the formative evaluation efforts. To the
contrary, we strongly believe that the formative
aspects should remain a key tool. This is because the
importance of formative evaluation in deterring
corruption can never be overstated. Take the example
of two flagship projects for maternal and child
health in India. Unfortunately, it was found that
these programmes were afflicted with bid rigging,
bribery, use of unqualified products, and forged
performance reviews6 that resulted in the World
Bank halting financing for the programmes for a
prolonged period. Sometimes, as in the health
projects in India, corruption deterrence can offer
greater mileage than devising a better technical
design. Given the primacy of corruption deterrence
in securing various entitlements (which is especially
true in the health sector), summative evaluation must
go hand in hand with formative evaluation. The
evaluator can give, if necessary, a rationale to the
partner government wanting to deter corruption
and implement the programmes more transparently.
In the next section, we will show a general
methodology for assessing the external validity from
the internally valid impact evaluations.
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4 A workable framework for external validity
In the context of Savedoff et al. (2006), impact
evaluation can be seen as a means to achieve two
goals: to provide the taxpayers accountability (achieving
internal validity), and to produce the knowledge to
maximise per dollar effectiveness (achieving external
validity). It is, however, well recognised that the impact
evaluation by itself can only reveal the results, not the
mechanism that created it. In other words, it only
deals with the internal validity. In most of the rigorous
evaluation studies, external validity is discussed
informally in contrast to its internal counterpart.
Savedoff et al. (2006) emphasise the importance of
achieving external validity, but they are silent on how
this can be done.
Why, then, implement rigorous evaluations when
they only serve one of the goals? How can we
deduce the mechanism from the internally valid
evaluation studies? One needs a clear, systematic
methodology to synthesise the available evidence to
produce the new knowledge. This section aims at
providing one such account, drawing on the idea of
Bayesian statistics/econometrics literature. It shows
that the way to produce useful knowledge about the
potential impacts, denoted as Vy~, and the mechanism,
denoted as M, working behind such impacts.
Bayes' rule states for a model M and data Y: 
(1)
That is, the conditional probability that the model M
is at work after observing the data Y is equal to the
right hand side of (1).
Pr[M] is a prior distribution of M. It is prior in the
sense that it is determined before we observe data
Y. One reasonable choice of prior is a posterior
distribution from previous estimation or the
consensus of the field. When there is no justification
or reason for choosing a particular probability density
function, Bayesians sometimes resort to the use of
noninformative or flat priors to escape from the
arbitrary choice. A flat prior, in essence, determines
all the elements as having an equal chance of
happening. It is also noteworthy that as the sample
size grows, the posterior will be less dependent on
the particular choice of a prior.
Pr[Y|M] is the probability we observe Y when the
model M is at work, or the likelihood of data, given
model M. This can be computed for each different
model. The final bit, Pr[Y], is the probability of
observing data. It is not important for our discussion to
know what it is, so we will skip the explanation of it.7
To see how the likelihood can be computed for each
model, let us consider an example. Suppose that a
parent allocates nutrition y among the children in a
household. Presumably, it is an increasing (or a non-
decreasing) function of wealth W. A theory of taste-
based intrahousehold gender discrimination
(mechanism 1, or M1) may indicate that if the child is
a girl, denoted with F = 1 and F = 0 for boys, then
less nutrition may be given. Another theory, call it
out-of-necessity gender discrimination theory (M2),
may tell that it is only when the household is poor
that parents may decide to discriminate against
daughters in favour of sons, so nutrition is an
increasing function of the interaction term F?W. In a
regression form, we have:
(2)
u is an error term which follows some distribution
function G(u). The pure taste-based gender
discrimination theory M1 would predict 
θ1 < 0, θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0, and the out-of-necessity gender
discrimination theory M2 would predict θ1 < 0, θ2 > 0,
and possibly θ3 > 0. So the different theories give
different restrictions on the parameter space. The
likelihood of data given model M1 is the value of the
distribution function of the above equation with
restrictions θ1 < 0, θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0 imposed. So we
evaluate the value of function G(u|M1) = G(y – θ0 – θ1 F)
with θ1 restricted to be some negative value. 
If the collected data show that y is not increasing with
F?W, then a proposed mechanism called the out-of-
necessity gender discrimination theory M2 has less
chance to hold, thus it has a smaller power in
explaining the data at hand, or M2's prediction of data
at hand Y has a small probability, or Pr[Y|M2] is low.
Consequently, using the Bayes' rule, we have a high
probability for M1, or Pr[M1|Y]. We have created the
knowledge that the taste-based gender discrimination
may be prevalent in this study area. However, we have
not shown if M1 is relevant to other areas. 
Using the posterior probability for a model M, we
can derive the posterior predictive probability of the
potential impact Vy~. To do so, let us assume that data
contains two elements, impact Vy~ and other
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explanatory variables x, or Y = (x, Vy~), and assume for
the moment that there are only two models, M1 and
M2. Then, posterior predictive probability of Vy~ given
x and Vy is:
Pr[Vy~|x, Vy] = Pr[Vy~|M1, x, Vy] Pr[M1|x, Vy] + 
Pr[Vy~|M2, x, Vy] Pr[M2|x, Vy] (3)
Pr[Mi|x, Vy] is obtained from (1) by replacing Y with x,
Vy, Pr[Vy~|Mi, x, Vy] is the likelihood of potential
impact Vy~ when model Mi is at work and we have
additional variables x to explain Vy. Note that the
potential impact only happens under M1 or M2, and
the probabilities conditional on each model being at
work are given by the likelihood Pr[Vy~|M1, x, Vy] and
Pr[Vy~|M2, x, Vy]. The total probability is given by
multiplying these conditional probabilities with the
probabilities of a conditioning event, or the
probabilities that each model is at work, Pr[M1|x, Vy]
and Pr[M2|x, Vy]. Hence we have the above.
Analogously, when there are I models M1, …, M1, the
posterior predictive probability of Vy~ given x and Vy is:
Pr[Vy~|x, Vy] = Pr[Vy~|M1, x, Vy] Pr[M1|x, Vy]+…+
Pr[Vy~|M1, x, Vy] Pr[M1|x, Vy],
=      Pr[Vy~|Mi, x, Vy] Pr[Mi|x, Vy] (4)    
Equation (4) shows how the relevance of Mi to other
areas affects the predictive probability of future
possible impacts Vy~. In terms of the example above,
the greater relevance of M1 is expressed as a high
posterior probability of M1, or a large Pr[M1|x, Vy]. So
Pr[Vy~|M1, x] for all the possible values of Vy~ will
receive a higher weight Pr[M1|x, Vy]. Then M1 gets
the larger weights in computing Pr[Vy~|x, Vy].
The procedure described is called ‘Bayesian model
averaging’ (BMA) which is useful in evaluating
numerous, unknown alternative models. There are
several approaches to implementing BMA. One can
use the ‘Markov chain Monte Carlo model composition’
(MC3) which is the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm
applied on a collection of models/mechanisms.
Another possibility is to use the ‘Occam's window’
approach which sets up criteria for selecting the
models/mechanisms using the posterior odds ratio.
As with any Bayesian method, one needs to evaluate
the multiple integrals implicit in Equation 2. This adds
a considerable computational burden, and its
implementation is not easy. See Hoeting et al.
(1999).8 This calls for the evaluators to collaborate
with the empirical experts on BMA.
We do not, of course, claim that the above is the
only methodology available. A counterpart
frequentist version exists, and interested readers are
advised to consult it.9, 10 Recently, Todd and Wolpin
(2006) have shown another way to verify the
mechanism behind the impact. They split the sample
into the model training (estimation) and the model
testing (out-of-sample prediction) parts, and tested
the mechanism derived from the model training part
with the data in the model testing part. Their
methodology is valid because their testing part is
known to have an accurate impact estimate Vy.
Our proposed approach is similar in spirit. Suppose
that we have from area 1 data x1, the impact estimate
Vy1, and the candidate models M1 ,.., M1, and we want
to consider the possible programme impact in area 2.
Having collected x1, we estimate Pr[Mi|x1, Vy1] with x1
and Vy1 for each Mi with (1). We can obtain posterior
predictive probability Pr[Vy~|x1, Vy1] using all the
possible models in Equation (4). If we collect the
variables x2 in area 2 prior to the intervention, we can
replace Pr[Vy~|Mi, x1,Vy1] with Pr[Vy~|Mi, x2, Vy1] by
substituting x2 in place of x1 in the likelihood Pr[Vy~|Mi,
x1 Vy1]. Then we can re-compute the posterior
predictive probability as Pr[Vy~|x2, Vy1].
In sum, the steps to follow between tth and t+ 1th
evaluation are:
1 Given xt, Vyt, {Mi}, for each Mi, compute 
Pr[Vy~t+1|Mi, xt, Vyt], derive Pr[Mi|xt, Vyt], and get
Pr[Vy~t+1|xt, Vyt].
2 Once xt+1 becomes available, replace 
Pr[Vy~t+1|Mi, xt, Vyt] with Pr[Vy~t+1|Mi, xt+1, Vyt] and
update the posterior predictive probability to get
Pr[Vy~t+1| xt+1, Vyt].
3 When Vyt+1 becomes available through rigorous
impact evaluation, fully update to get 
Pr[Mi|xt, xt+1, Vyt, Vyt+1] and Pr[Vy~t+2|xt, xt+1, Vyt, Vyt+1].
With an insight from evaluation study or data, add
other candidate models MI+1, … if necessary.
This suggests that it is imperative to pool information
on Pr[Vy~|M, x, Vy], Pr[M|x, Vy], or previously
collected data {x, Vy} with a collection of candidate
mechanisms {Mi}. A researcher or an evaluator who





has a new data set {x, Vy} should be able to update
the posterior distributions.
It does not, however, necessarily call for the creation
of a new entity nor central planning of evaluation
studies. Academia is a good working example of how
a decentralised community shares useful information
to update knowledge; a website may suffice,
provided that evaluation research funding is
conditional on posting the data on a website. This
also means that an evaluator who is interested in
achieving external validity must know the theories M
and their implications for the respective likelihood
Pr[x, Vy|M]. Again, it suggests a scope for fruitful
collaboration with the research community.
5 Conclusion
Drawing on JBIC's experience, we showed that
historical and institutional features of Japan's ODA
such as concentration in large-scale infrastructure
projects in Asian countries, separation between
technical and financial assistance administration, and
the principle of request-based commitment impede
the swift adoption of rigorous impact evaluations.
Randomisation is impossible in large-scale infrastructure
projects and the construction of counterfactuals
directly from actual survey data may not be appropriate.
Bureaucratic separation between technical and financial
assistance bars the project management from the
evaluator's perspective. Request-based commitment
allows a greater placement bias by the policymakers. 
We also showed that the global trends of
decentralisation and participatory decision-making
are posing additional difficulty in estimating impacts
consistently. Dispersed small-scale infrastructure
projects are often based on local request and
decentralised decision-making, and the removal of
self-selection bias requires proper understanding of
application processes. Decentralised decision-making
also results in heterogeneity of treatment.
For accountability reasons, JBIC's impact evaluation
has traditionally focused on summative aspects. With
rising interest in internally valid impact evaluations,
JBIC has started to treat the summative aspects of
internal validity as a way to show the effectiveness of
the ODA projects. The focus on summative aspects,
or a rigorous impact evaluation, is an important
change of direction, but this does not mean that we
can neglect the utility of formative evaluation in
securing transparency. 
Finally, we have pointed out that rigorous impact
evaluation alone is not sufficient for learning from
past programmes, and argued that we must
understand the mechanism that produced the
measured impact to better predict the future aid
impact. The notion of external validity in ODA
evaluation, unfortunately, has not been popularised.
This is partly due to the paucity of attempts by the
evaluation community to establish external validity.
We have thus proposed a systematic deductive
method for establishing external validity. We relied on
the Bayesian framework as we believe it to be the
most natural choice in analysing the learning
processes. But it is by no means the only way, and the
suggested directions are shown to be the same from
both the Bayesian and frequentist perspectives. We
have suggested that the data and analysis should be
shared among the evaluators, and that the evaluation
community should work more closely with the
research community to assist the learning process.
Our conclusion somewhat echoes the conclusions of
the empirical growth literature and the aid
effectiveness literature. As noted in Durlauf (2003)
and Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005), the cross-
country panel growth regression analysis has its
limits in drawing conclusions from data by its model
uncertainty. Roodman (2007) cites Leamer's lecture
on specification search and concludes by pointing out
that the main source of fragility of the cross-country
aid-growth literature is the choice of controls. 
Thus far, we have pointed out many difficulties of
introducing rigorous impact evaluation in the
bilateral aid institutions. At the aid institution or
organisation level, a set-up for conducting rigorous
impact evaluations and accumulating more
experiences will be very beneficial for the
international aid community. However, a centralised
solution, such as creating a new international
organisation, is not feasible because of difficulties in
both methodology and process. A decentralised
approach, starting from new basic guidelines of
impact evaluation and communication and learning
best practices among the international aid
community seems the only solution, at this stage, for
rigorous measurement of aid impact. We believe
that the issue posed in our article deserves more
analytical work by researchers and evaluators in the
aid community. 
IDS Bulletin Volume 39  Number 1  March 2008 79
Notes
1 JICA and JBIC are planned to be integrated in
October 2008.
2 For further details, please see the final evaluation
report at the JBIC website (www.jbic.go.jp/
english/oec/post/2006/pdf/te03_full.pdf)
3 There can also be sample selection bias on the
observables, but this can be controlled by modelling
attrition with them, so we will not regard this as a
problem. See Wooldridge (2002: 585–90).
4 For further details, please see the final evaluation
report at the JBIC website (www.jbic.go.jp/
english/oec/post/2006/pdf/te02_02_full.pdf).
5 These are: longitude, latitude, altitude, number of
inhabitants, number of dwellings, distance to
district capital, distance to national capital,
existence of primary school, existence of medical
centre, water availability, electricity availability,
sewage availability, infant mortality rate, illiteracy
rate, qualifies as very poor, qualifies as extremely
poor. See Table 5.13 of GRADE (2007).
6 See the internal investigative report by the
Department of Institutional Integrity of the
World Bank (2005).
7 We compute Pr[Y] by using the likelihood and
the prior. Suppose there are two possible models.
Then we observe Y only under the two models,
and their probabilities conditioned on each
model, or the likelihood of each model, can be
written as Pr[Y|M1] and Pr[Y|M2]. So the (total)
probability of observing Y is an average (expected
value) of Pr[Y|M1] and Pr[Y|M2]:
Pr[Y] = Pr[Y|M1] Pr[M1] + Pr[Y|M2] Pr[M2]. This
depends on the prior Pr[Mi], but it is not
problematic because they can be cancelled out
once we take the posterior odds ratio
Pr[Mi|Y]/Pr[Mj|Y] when we assess the relative
relevance of some models Mi and Mj.
8 There are known implementation issues in BMA
which are actively studied: model search,
convergence, choice of prior, and comparison
over algorithms. Freely available programmes exist
to carry out the computation.
9 There are studies comparing the relative merits
and performances of these methodologies (see
references cited in Raftery and Zheng 2003).
However, we believe the Bayesian methodology
to be more flexible and intuitively appealing. 
10 The frequentist approach is the mainstream
school of thought in statistics. Almost all the
school curricula up to high school in developed
countries teach the frequentist method. Bayesians
are the minority school, but this is gaining
popularity as computing power becomes cheaper
with technological advances in hardware and the
development of new computing algorithms.
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